Mr. Frank Haskell whom
I knew well was a very accomplished gentleman and a very brave officer.
He wrote a very graphic description of the battle of Gettysburg from the
field shortly after the battle in the form of a letter to his brother.
His story is thrilling and in as far as it relates to what he personally
saw and did is entitled to full credit. In other respects it can make no
claim to historical accuracy. It was not written for publication and without
either opportunity or so far as appears any attempt to gain reliable information
on subjects referred to.
His references to and
insinuations against the 11th Corps are without justification. They are
a reflex of the prejudice against that corps which at that time prevailed
in the Army of the Potomac by reason of the disastrous defeat it had sustained
at Chancellorsville two months before, the causes of which were not then
fully understood.
No Operation of any part
of the 11th Corps came under Col. Haskell's personal observation.
On the first day when
the chief engagement of this corps occurred and when its very heavy losses
were sustained, Col. Haskells was miles away from the field of battle.
The battle of that day was a severe trial of the two small corps (the 1st
and the 11th) that were on the ground. They were doomed to meet the greater
half of Genl. Lee's entire army. They had to meet it suddenly on ground
that had not been reconnoitered. The 11th Corps came into the battle form
a distance of 12 miles, a large part of the distance on the double quick.
Two of its divisions, the 1st and 3d were rushed into the fight to the
north of Gettysburg to the relief of the 1st Corps already very heavily
pressed. Col. Haskell's caustic remarks fall mainly on these two divisions
although he has [?] also for the Second Div. Which General Howard very
wisely retained on cemetery Hill where he also assembled and posted all
the reserve artillery of the corps, as the rallying point to which he knew
that the part of the army under his command would have to retreat, under
very substantial reinforcements should reach him within a shortness of
time that could not be even hoped for. The battle was on when the 11th
Corps arrived. It could not hope to win but only to [?] it. It had to go
in no matter at what sacrifice for the sake of gaining time. Lee's army
was closely concentrated near Gettysburg while Mead's Corps were scattered
at considerable distances. Under these circumstances the two divisions
of the 11th Corps were marched far to the north and far beyond the right
to the 1st Corps. Perhaps they were sent out too far. This has been claimed.
But that has nothing to do with Col. Haskell's situations. It is time that
the position it took up was an extremely exposed and hazardous one. This
was not evident at first but it soon became so when the heavy rebel division
of General Early came upon the field over roads leading directly to the
right flank and rear of Genl. Barlow's position on the right of the 11th
Corps. Taken at this disadvantage and vastly outnumbered retreat was inevitable.
And it was necessarily disorderly. Retreat within organized bodies of the
enemy on the flank and in rear from so exposed a position as then troops
had been placed in is always in more or less broken order. They made their
way back constantly under fire over the fields to the city and then through
the streets to the selected railing point on Cemetery Hill. From this point
the reserve artillery of the corps supported by its second division had
in the meantime rendered most valuable service, keeping the assailants
in check so that they did not dare to follow-up their success or make any
attack on this position.
The 1st as well as the
11th Corps arrived at this position very broken condition. But breaks to
the making and holding of this important point by a portion of the 11th
Corps all the troops as they arrived could be assigned to places in its
support, of course they were terribly fatigued with the heat and the labor
and the bloodshed of that day. Of course, I do not claim that every man
of the corps was a hero - that many in their distress did not seek the
shelter of homes and hide there as they passed through that town. There
was more or less of that in both corps. There always will be under similar
circumstances. There are skulkers in every battle and they are formed in
every military organization. But there is no warrant whatever for Col.
H.'s slur upon the 11th Corps for its conduct on that day.
Still less reason I might
almost say, certainly no more reason is there for the discouragement and
[?] does in respect of the [?] day. Col H was nearer the ground that he
had been on the day before. But he was still far away from it. He did see
the first thing of what he mentions. The scene of conflict was late at
night after sunset and almost dark. The force of the enemy had come up
from the ravine, overcome the line of the 1st Corps at the foot of the
hill and rushed upon a wear [?] point in our battery line on the brow of
a steep hill. For a moment our line was broken, there was some confusion
on [?] of the darkness but our troops were immediately rallied, moved promptly
forward and established their line. The [?]was defeated and gathered a
number of prisoners remained in our hands.
It was one of those incidents
that [?] in every battle, many of which occurred in the battle of Gettysburg
- on very notable one which Col. H so vividly describes in his own 2d Corps
on that same afternoon when he rallied and brought a brigade which had
abandoned its breastworks, [?] to its [?plme] of duty.
The sacrificial services
as they may be called of the 1st and 11th Corps on the 1st of July 1863
alone made the subsequent victory a possibility. The severest trial that
ever comes to a body of troops is to be compelled to [?] from a position
in which it is posted. To place it in position where this must be the result
if sometimes a duty.
At Chancellorsville it
was not. On the first day at Gettysburg, I believe that it was. The troops
who did that duty even if they did it but fairly well should not be subjected
to [?]
I was present with the
11th Corps throughout the battle. Looking back I may think that somethings
might have been done better. But that is a common experience in all affairs.
Thrown into the emergency as it was, I doubt where any other corps of equal
strength would have done any better service.
Milw Winkler Correspondence Mss W (ARC) UWM Milwaukee