O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXV/1 [S# 39]
APRIL 27-MAY 6, 1863.--The Chancellorsville Campaign.
No. 252.--Report of Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz, U.S. Army, commanding
Third Division, with correspondence, &c.
CAMP NEAR STAFFORD COURT-HOUSE, VA.,
May 12, 1863.
GENERAL:
About the part taken by
the division under my command in the operations of the Army of the Potomac
from April 27 to May 6, I beg leave to report as follows:
I deem it unnecessary
to speak of the marches we executed previous to our arrival on the battle-field
of May 2, as my division marched along with the corps without any separate
action. I will only say that all orders were executed by officers and men
with promptness and alacrity, and that the men marched better, were in
higher spirits, and endured the fatigues and hardships of the march by
night and day more cheerfully than ever before. I have never known my command
to be in a more excellent condition. The division arrived at the junction
of the Orange Court-House Plank road and the old turnpike in the afternoon
of April 30. I was ordered to go into camp, facing west, on the open ground
near Hawkins' farm. The disposition I made of my forces is shown on Diagram
No. 1.
CAMP OF THE THIRD DIVISION on April 30.
DIAGRAM No. I. [bitmap]
SECOND POSITION OF THE THIRD DIVISION on May 1.
DIAGRAM No. II [bitmap]
In this position the division
remained until noon, May 1, when we received marching orders, which, to
the disappointment of the troops, were countermanded immediately afterward.
I then was ordered to take a position facing south, connecting with the
First Division, under General Devens, on my right, and the Second Division,
under General Steinwehr, on my left. I placed General Schimmelfennig's
brigade on my right, connecting on his right with General McLean's brigade,
of the First Division, and ordered Colonel Krzyzanowski to occupy my left,
to connect on his left with Colonel Buschbeck's brigade, of the Second
Division. The dispositions I made are shown in detail on Diagram No. 2;
in addition to which I have to observe that the two regiments forming my
extreme right were ordered by me to be placed in column on the open field
immediately on the left of General McLean's brigade, so as to give them
liberty of movement, but that they were drawn back behind the fence and
deployed in line of battle on the old Turnpike road, as I understand, by
special directions from headquarters. Behind my Second Brigade, Colonel
Krzyzanowski, I placed a strong reserve, so as to be able to assist
Colonel Buschbeck, whose line was at the time very thin. The Eighty-second
Ohio I kept farther back, as a general reserve. My pickets were at a suitable
distance in front, south of the Plank road, connecting with those of General
Devens on the right and General Steinwehr on the left. Captain Dilger's
battery was placed at the junction of the two roads, commanding the Plank
road, the valley below, and the woods beyond.
The firing we heard all
along the line of the army during the day seemed to indicate that the enemy
was feeling our front in its whole length. Toward evening the enemy began
to throw shells from two pieces placed on an open space in the woods opposite
General Devens' left, but doing no injury. This fire was not replied to
by our artillery.
General Schimmelfennig
received the order to send forward one regiment to capture or drive away
those pieces. A short but lively skirmish ensued, in which some of our
men were wounded, and the officers commanding the expedition returned with
the report that the pieces had already been withdrawn. A subsequent reconnaissance
proved this to be true. A negro was brought in from a farm near the place
where the guns had stood, and reported that he had seen some rebel troops
moving westward; but the information he gave us was very indefinite.
Meanwhile my chief of
staff, Major [Ernest F.] Hoffmann, was ordered by you to superintend the
construction rifle.pits along our whole front, facing south. Pioneers and
fatigue parties worked all night, and at daybreak the rifle.pits were nearly
completed. General Schimmelfennig obstructed the wood road in his front,
south of the Plank road, with abatis. The night passed off quietly, the
troops of my division remaining in the position above indicated.
Early in the morning
of May 2, General Hooker passed along the whole line, and was received
by officers and men with great demonstrations of enthusiasm.
As the general disposition
made of the rest of the corps had great influence upon the part taken by
my division in the action of the evening, I beg leave to say a few words
about the distribution of the forces of the First and Second Divisions
in connection with mine. The extreme right was occupied by General Devens'
(First) brigade, under Colonel von Gilsa, consisting of the Forty-first,
Forty-fifth, and Fifty-fourth New York, and the One hundred and fifty-third
Pennsylvania. Part of this brigade (two regiments) was formed at an angle
with the old turnpike, fronting nearly west. On the road itself one section
of Captain Dieckmann's battery was placed behind an abatis. Colonel von
Gilsa's left connected with General McLean's brigade, consisting of the
Twenty-fifth, Fifty-fifth, Seventy-fifth, and One hundred and seventh Ohio,
and the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers. This brigade was formed in
line of battle on the old Turnpike road, with one regiment in second line
and one detached as a reserve for Colonel von Gilsa. Four pieces of Captain
Dieckmann's battery were pieced near General McLean's left, on open and
high ground.
Immediately east of Talley's
farm, where General Devens had his headquarters, General McLean's left
connected with my right, consisting of the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania
and the Sixty-first Ohio, of General Schimmelfennig's brigade, deployed
in line of battle on the road, having an embankment in their front and
the thickest kind of pine undergrowth immediately in their rear; on their
left the Sixty-eighth New York, of the same brigade, also in line of battle;
the sharpshooters of the brigade in the little piece of woods between the
two roads east of the open field flanking the line; the Eighty-second Illinois
and the One hundred and fifty-seventh New York behind General Schimmelfennig's
left, in second line, connecting with General Schimmelfennig's left; the
One hundred and nineteenth New York, of my Second Brigade, occupying the
southern border of the little piece of woods above mentioned; then Dilger's
battery; the Fifty-eighth New York in the church grove; behind the interval
the Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania, and farther to the left the Twenty-sixth
Wisconsin, in second line, and the Eighty-second Ohio still farther back,
as above stated. On the left of Captain Dilger's battery commenced Colonel
Buschbeck's brigade, part of which was deployed in the rifle-pits; Captain
Wiedrich's battery, from which two pieces had been detached to General
Barlow's brigade, stood near Colonel Buschbeck's right on high ground.
On the left of Colonel Buschbeck, General Barlow's brigade, with one section
of Captain Wiedrich's battery. Farther to the left, troops of other corps.
A rifle-pit was constructed, running north and south, on the west of the
eminence east of Dowdall's Tavern. The Reserve Artillery, which arrived
in the course of the day, was placed on that eminence.
This position was, in
my humble opinion, a good one to move from if the army had followed up
the offensive, which, no doubt, had originally been contemplated. As a
defensive position it presented a front only moderately strong to resist
a parallel attack coming from the south. I say moderately strong, as the
line, especially on our right, was very thin, and we had no general reserve.
But if this position was intended to protect the right and rear of the
army, a look at the map will show that it lacked some of the most essential
requisites. Our right wing stood completely in the air, with nothing to
lean upon, not even a strong _chelon, and with no reliable cavalry to make
reconnaissances, and that, too, in a forest thick enough not to permit
any view to the front, flank, or rear, but not thick enough to prevent
the approach of the enemy's troops. Our rear was at the mercy of the enemy,
who was at perfect liberty to walk right around us through the large gap
between von Gilsa's right and the cavalry force which was stationed at
Ely's Ford, and which, at all events, had no considerable power of resistance.
If it was really the intention that we should act on the defensive and
cover the right and rear of the whole army, our right ought to have been
drawn back toward the Rapidan, to rest on that river, at or near the mouth
of Hunting Run, the corps abandoning so much of the Plank road as to enable
it to establish a solid line. As we were actually situated, an attack from
the west and northwest could not be resisted for any length of time without
a complete change of front on our part. To such a change, especially if
it was to be made in haste, the formation of our forces was exceedingly
unfavorable.
It was almost impossible
to maneuver some of our regiments under fire of the enemy, hemmed in as
they were on the old turnpike by embankments and rifle-pits in front and
thick woods in the rear, drawn out in long, deployed lines, giving just
room enough for the stacks of arms and a narrow passage; and this old Turnpike
road was at the same time the only line of communication we had between
the different parts of our front. Such was the position occupied by the
Eleventh Corps on May 2.
In the course of the forenoon I was informed that large columns
of the enemy could be seen from General Devens' headquarters, moving from
east to west on a road running nearly parallel with the Plank road, on
a ridge at a distance of about 2 miles or over. I observed them plainly
as they moved on. I rode back to your headquarters, and on the way ordered
Captain Dilger to look for good artillery positions on the field fronting
west, as the troops would, in all probability, have to execute a change
of front.
The matter was largely
discussed at your headquarters, and I entertained and expressed in our
informal conversations the opinion that we should form upon the open ground
we then occupied, with our front at right angles with the Plank road, lining
the church grove and the border of the woods east of the open plain with
infantry, placing strong echelons behind both wings, and distributing the
artillery along the front on ground most favorable for its action, especially
on the eminence on the right and left of Dowdall's Tavern. In this position,
sweeping the open plains before us with our artillery and musketry, and
checking the enemy with occasional offensive returns, we might have been
able to maintain ourselves even against superior forces at least long enough
to give General Hooker time to take measures according to the exigencies
of the moment. Soon afterward we were informed that two divisions of General
Sickles' corps were to attack in flank and rear the column of the enemy
which we had seen marching, and you were requested to detach one of your
brigades for their support. This weakened the force you might have used
as a general reserve very materially.
In the absence of orders, but becoming more and more convinced that
the enemy's attack would come from the west and fall upon our right and
rear, I took it upon my own responsibility to detach two regiments from
the second line of my Second Brigade, and to place them in a good position
on the right and left of the Ely's Ford road, west of Hawkins' farm, so
as to check the enemy if he should attack our extreme right and penetrate
through the woods at that point. This was subsequently approved by you.
The regiments I selected were the Seventy-fifth
Pennsylvania and the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin. The Seventy fifth Pennsylvania
had to relieve the pickets of the Second Brigade, and was replaced by the
Fifty-eighth New York. The Eighty-second Ohio I placed at some distance
behind the left of the Fifty-eighth
New York. The disposition of my troops was then as shown on Diagram
No. 3, and, no orders reaching me, it remained so until the battle commenced.
With these exceptions, no change was made in the position occupied by the
corps.
Brigadier-General Schimmelfennig,
commanding my First Brigade, made several reconnaissances in his front
and that of General Devens, especially on the Plank road and through the
wooded country south of
Position Of The Third Division At The Time Of The Attack On Our Right.
DIAGRAM No. III.[bitmap]
it; but these reconnaissances, made with infantry, were necessarily
confined to a limited compass, and brought no other fact to light but that
the enemy's skirmishers were found at a distance of 1+ to 2 miles in considerable
number.
Meanwhile we heard General
Sickles' artillery, but the firing did not continue long, so that it seemed
as if the attack on the flank and rear of that column of the enemy which
we had seen marching toward our right had been checked or given up.
It was between 3 and
4 p.m. when the section of artillery attached to Colonel von Gilsa's brigade
gave two discharges, followed by a short musketry fire. We hastened to
the front, and received the report that only a few rebel cavalrymen had
shown themselves on the old turnpike, and that the artillery had fired
without orders. All became quiet again. I ordered General Schimmelfennig
to push another reconnaissance up the Plank road. The instructions he received
from headquarters were to the effect that he should avoid everything that
might bring on an engagement. The reconnoitering party returned after some
time with the report that they had heard the yells and shouts of a large
number of men behind the enemy's line of skirmishers. The cavalry, which
had been attached to your command but a few days before, and whose business
it was to clear up our front and flank, repeatedly reported that at some
distance from our pickets they had been fired upon, and that then, of course,
they could go no farther. Immediately before the enemy rushed upon us,
a reconnoitering party of that cavalry went into the woods in front of
the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin; returned after about ten minutes, and informed
the officers of the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin that it was all right, and then
went quietly to rest behind Hawkins' farm.
It was nearly 6 o'clock
when we suddenly heard a sharp artillery and musketry fire on our extreme
right. I at once ordered all regiments within my reach to change front.
The One hundred and nineteenth New York I took out of its position in the
woods, facing south, and formed it near the junction of the Plank road
and the old turnpike, facing west. The Sixty-eighth
New York received the order to occupy the western edge of the same
piece of woods, the southern border of which had been occupied by the One
hundred and nineteenth. On the right of the One hundred and nineteenth
formed the One hundred and fifty seventh New York, then the Eighty-second
Illinois, and farther to the right the Eighty-second
Ohio, the latter receiving from me the order to cover the left of the
Fifty-eighth New York, to fire one volley if the enemy should break through
the woods in front, and then to make a bayonet charge. The Fifty-eighth
New York and the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, on the extreme right, remained
as they were, under the immediate command of Colonel Krzyzanowski. Captain
Dilger, commanding my battery, drew his pieces back to the high ground,
near Wiedrich's battery, and opened upon the columns of the enemy as soon
as they showed themselves on the old turnpike.
To change the front of
the regiments deployed in line on the old Turnpike road was extremely difficult.
In the first place, they were hemmed in between a variety of obstacles
in front and dense pine brush in their rear. Then the officers had hardly
had time to give a command when almost the whole of General McLean's brigade,
mixed up with a number of Colonel von Gilsa's men, came rushing down the
road from General Devens' headquarters in wild confusion, and, worse than
that, the battery of the First Division broke in upon my right at a full
run. This confused mass of guns, caissons, horses, and men broke lengthwise
through the ranks of my regiments deployed in line on the road. While this
was going on, several men of the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, which formed
my extreme right, were shot from behind, the enemy having already penetrated
into the woods immediately in the rear of our original position. It was
evident that under such circumstances it was an utter impossibility to
establish a front at that point. The whole line deployed on the old turnpike,
facing south, was rolled up and swept away in a moment. If the regiments
had remained as they were at first formed, in column on the open field,
it would have been easy to give them a correct front by a simple wheeling,
and the turmoil on the road would not have disturbed them. As it was, the
Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania and the Sixty-first Ohio Regiments, which I
had counted among the best I had, and which had never been guilty of any
discreditable conduct, could do nothing but endeavor to rally behind the
second line.
This second line, as above described, had changed front, and was
formed behind a rise of ground between the church grove and the woods,
from which the enemy was expected, but every evolution was attended with
the
greatest difficulty, as the scattered men of the First Division were continually
breaking through our ranks.
In my extreme right, where the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin and the Fifty-eighth
New York stood, things wore a similar aspect. A short time after the attack
had commenced, a large number of men of the First Brigade, First Division,
came running back through the woods, the enemy following closely on their
heels. Captain [Frederick] Braun, commanding the Fifty-eighth New York,
fell from his horse, mortally wounded, immediately after having deployed
his regiment. The enemy was, however, received at that point with great
firmness. The Fifty-eighth New York, a very small regiment, exposed to
a flanking fire from the left, where the enemy broke through, and severely
pressed in front, was pushed back after a struggle of several minutes.
The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, flanked on both sides and exposed to a terrible
fire in front, maintained the unequal contest for a considerable time.
This young regiment, alone and unsupported, firmly held the ground where
I had placed it for about twenty-minutes; nor did it fall back until I
ordered it to do so.
There is hardly an officer
in the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin who has not at least received a bullet through
his clothes. Had it not been for the praiseworthy firmness of these men
he enemy would have obtained possession of the woods opposite without resistance,
taken the north and south rifle-pit from the rear, and appeared on the
Plank road between Dowdall's Tavern and Chancellorsville before the artillery
could have been withdrawn. The order to fall back to the border of the
woods behind was given to Colonel Krzyzanowski in consequence of the following
circumstances:
The tide of fugitives
had hardly subsided a little on our left, when the enemy's columns, preceded
by a thick cloud of skirmishers, presented themselves on and to the right
and left of the old turnpike. My regiments had hardly had time to change
their position and to wheel into the new front, under what difficulties
I have above stated. They had just formed behind the little rise of ground
in front of the church grove when the enemy's columns issued from the woods.
The enemy's front of
attack, as we saw it, extended considerably beyond our extreme right. His
regiments were formed apparently in column by division, the skirmishers
throwing themselves into the intervals whenever their advance was checked.
The enemy was formed at least three, perhaps four, lines of columns deep,
the intervals between lines being very short, the whole presenting a heavy,
solid mass.
It was observed by Captain
Dilger that several regiments marched from Talley's farm by the right flank
down to the Plank road and the low ground south of it, so as to envelop
our left. The Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania, which was on picket, was thus
taken in the rear, and in its dispersed condition found itself, of course,
obliged to fall back, its line of skirmishers, which was facing south,
being driven in from the flank or captured. The regiment lost a number
of men killed and wounded and a good many prisoners, among the latter Lieutenant-Colonel
Matzdorff.
As the enemy emerged
from the woods, the regiments of my second line stopped him with a well-directed
and rapid fire. Colonel Peissner, of the One hundred and nineteenth New
York, a gentleman of the highest order of character and ability, and an
officer of great merit, was one of the first to fall, pierced by two bullets.
The enemy was gaining rapidly on the left of the One hundred and
nineteenth, which was then exposed to a very severe enfilading fire. The
line fell back step by step to the neighborhood of the church grove, facing
about and firing as it yielded. Meanwhile the batteries of Captains Dilger
and Wiedrich had kept up a rapid fire, first with spherical case, upon
the enemy's columns as they descended from Talley's farm, and then with
grape and canister. In and on both sides of the church grove the regiments
halted, to make another stand.
Colonel Hecker, of the Eighty-second Illinois, fell, wounded, from
his horse while holding the colors of his regiment in his hands and giving
the order to charge bayonets. Major Rolshausen, of the same regiment, who
then assumed command, was wounded immediately afterward.
The Eighty-second Ohio
was directed to draw farther to the right, and to occupy the projecting
angle of the woods on the right and rear of the church grove; but, while
executing this order, one of your aides directed him to occupy the right
of the north and south rifle-pit, where the regiment established itself.
About that time one of
Colonel Krzyzanowski's aides came to me, asking for re-enforcements, as
the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, being nearly enveloped on all sides, could
no longer maintain its position. Having no re-enforcements to send, I gave
the order to fall back to the border of the woods east of the open ground.
The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin then marched in retreat in good order, facing
about and firing as often as possible.
Meanwhile the enemy, after having forced back the One hundred and
nineteenth New York by his enfilading fire, gained rapidly on the left
of Captain Dilger's battery. This battery and that of Captain Wiedrich
remained in position until the very last moment. Captain Dilger limbered
up only when the enemy's infantry was already between his pieces. His horse
was shot under him, as well as the two wheel horses and one lead horse
of one of his guns. After an ineffectual effort to drag this piece along
with the dead horses still hanging in the harness, he had to abandon it
to the enemy. The conduct of this brilliant officer was, on this as on
all former occasions, exemplary.
The enemy was now pouring
in great force upon our right and left, and the position in and near the
church grove could no longer be held. The two regiments still remaining
there gave several discharges, and then fell back in good order. Arriving
near the north and south rifle-pit, General Schimmelfennig ordered the
Eighty-second Illinois to charge into the projecting corner of the woods
on the right, the border of which was already in possession of the enemy.
The One hundred and fifty-seventh was directed to fall back along the Plank
road, so as to clear the front of the rifle-pit, which seemed to be well
filled with men, and to take position on the border of the woods behind.
The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin had, in the meantime, been very severely pressed
on the extreme right, and there the regiment lost somewhat its compactness,
the woods being very thick and the wing companies becoming detached. It
was at that moment when I rejoined you behind the rifle pit, which was
manned in the center by some of Colonel Buschbeck's regiments; on the left
by several companies of the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, Sixty-first Ohio,
and One hundred and nineteenth New York, and on the extreme right by the
Eighty-second Ohio. Several pieces of the Reserve Artillery were still
firing.
Behind the rifle-pit
there was a confused mass of men belonging to all divisions, whom we made
every possible effort to rally and reorganize, a thing extremely difficult
under the fire of the enemy. I succeeded once in gathering a numerous crowd,
and, placing myself at its head, led it forward with a hurrah. It followed
me some distance, but was again dispersed by the enemy's fire. One of my
staff officers was wounded on that occasion. I tried the same experiment
two or three times, but always with the same result.
The enemy advancing on
our right and left with rapidity, the artillery ceased firing, and soon
the rifle-pit was given up. The Eighty-second Ohio maintained itself very
bravely there until the whole of the rifle-pit was abandoned. The loss
of that regiment on this spot was very heavy. It was then after 7 p.m.
The retreat now became
general, and the confusion increased as the troops marched through the
woods. The One hundred and fifty-seventh New York, still in good order,
stopped several times, firing and charging upon the pursuing enemy.
Captain Dilger had sent
his battery toward Chancellorsville, keeping one piece with him, which
he brought several times into action with very good success during the
retreat of the corps. The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, Eighty-second Ohio, One
hundred and fifty-seventh New York, and the Eighty-second Illinois halted
on the right of a line occupied by what was supposed to be General Berry's
division. There they remained until about 8.30 p.m., when they retreated
farther, to an open space north of Chancellorsville.
After 9 o'clock, the order reached them to march to the rallying
place of the Eleventh Corps, west of the Chancellor house. I rallied large
fragments of several regiments partly behind the abatis in the woods, partly
a little farther back, near the creek west of the Chancellor house. It
was about 9 o'clock when I marched with them to the general rendezvous.
The corps was reorganized before 11 o'clock.
Early on the morning
of May 3, I was ordered to relieve General Humphreys' division, on the
extreme left of the army, near Scott's Mills. Nothing happened in my front
except a little skirmishing.
At about 11 p.m. I was relieved by the Twelfth Corps, and then took
position behind the First Division, which was deployed in the rifle-pits,
our right resting on the Second Corps.
In the course of the
4th, my division took a more concentrated position, five regiments being
deployed in the rifle-pits and five in column, in the second line, on the
extreme right of the corps. Nothing but light skirmishing in our front.
So my division remained on the 5th.
Early on the morning
of the 6th, we recrossed the Rappahannock at United States Ford, together
with the rest of the army. On the evening of the same day, I reached my
old encampment, near Stafford Court-House.
The losses suffered by
my division in the action of May 2 were very severe in proportion to my
whole effective force. I had 15 officers killed, 23 wounded, and 15 missing,
and 102 men killed, 365 wounded, and 441 missing; total, 953.(*) Of those
reported as missing, a good many have already been found wounded in the
hospitals, and it is probable that a large proportion of them were left
killed or wounded on the battlefield. My whole loss amounted to about 23
per cent.
In closing this report,
I beg leave to make one additional remark. The Eleventh Corps, and, by
error or malice, especially the Third Division, has been held up to the
whole country as a band of cowards. My division has been made responsible
for the defeat of the Eleventh Corps, and the Eleventh Corps for the failure
of the campaign. Preposterous as this is, yet we have been overwhelmed
by the army and the press with abuse and insult beyond measure. We have
borne as much as human nature can endure. I am far from saying that on
May 2 everybody did his duty to the best of his power. But one thing I
will say, because I know it: these men are no cowards. I have seen most
of them fight before this, and they fought as bravely as any. I am also
far from saying that it would have been quite impossible to do better in
the position the corps occupied on May 2; but I have seen with my own eyes
troops who now affect to look down upon the Eleventh Corps with sovereign
contempt behave much worse under circumstances far less trying.
Being charged with such
an enormous responsibility as the failure of a campaign involves, it would
seem to me that very commander in this corps has a right to a fair investigation
of his conduct and of the circumstances surrounding him and his command
on that occasion. I would, therefore, most respectfully and most urgently
ask for permission to publish this report. Every statement contained therein
is strictly truthful, to the best of my information. If I have erred in
any particular, my errors can easily be corrected. But if what I say is
true, I deem it due to myself and those who serve under me that the country
should know it.
I am, general, most respectfully,
your obedient servant,
C. SCHURZ,
Major-General, Comdg. Third Division, Eleventh Army Corps.
Maj. Gen. O. O. HOWARD,
Commanding Eleventh Army Corps.
-----
CAMP NEAR STAFFORD COURT-HOUSE,
May 18, 1863.
Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:
SIR:
I would respectfully ask
for permission to publish my report on the part taken by my division in
the action of the 2d of May. My reasons for making this request are the
following:
The conduct of the Eleventh
Corps, and especially of my division, has been so outrageously and so persistently
misrepresented by the press throughout the country, and officers, as well
as men, have had and still have to suffer so much abuse and insult at the
hands of the rest of the army, that they would seem to have a right to
have a true statement of the circumstances of the case laid before the
people, so that they may hope to be judged by their true merits.
It is a very hard thing
for soldiers to be universally stigmatized as cowards, and apt to demoralize
them more than a defeat. Without claiming for the officers and men of my
command anything that is not due them, I would respectfully represent that
in my humble opinion it would be but just, and greatly for the benefit
of the morale of the men, that the country should be made to understand
the disastrous occurrence of the 2d of May in its true character.
If the publication of
my report should seem inexpedient to you, I would respectfully ask for
a court of inquiry, to publicly investigate the circumstances surrounding
my command on the 2d of May, and the causes of its defeat.
I am, sir, most respectfully,
your obedient servant,
C. SCHURZ,
Major-General, Comdg. Third Division, Eleventh Army Corps.
[ Indorsements. ]
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS,
May 18, 1863.
Respectfully forwarded.
O. O. HOWARD,
Major-General, Commanding.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 18, 1863.
Respectfully forwarded. I hope soon to be able to transmit all the reports of the recent battles, and meanwhile I cannot approve of the publication of an isolated report.
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.
-----
HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS,
May 21, 1863.
GENERAL:
The arrangement spoken
of between yourself and the Secretary of War with regard to my transfer
to another army is not acceptable, under present circumstances. You remember
that about seven weeks ago I expressed a desire to leave with my troops,
for the reason that I anticipated difficulties which would be apt to impair
the efficiency of the corps. The disaster which befell us on the 2d of
May has brought about a state of things which seems to justify my apprehensions
in a much larger measure than I had expected; nevertheless it is now impossible
for me and my troops to agree to an arrangement which formerly we would
have been happy to accept.
My reasons are these:
I have been most outrageously slandered by the press. Ridiculous as it
may seem, my division has been made responsible for the defeat of the corps;
my officers and men have been called cowards. If we go now, will it not
have the appearance as if we were shaken off by the Army of the Potomac?
Would it not to a certainty confirm the slanders circulated about me? Would
it not seem as if I voluntarily accepted the responsibility for the disaster
of May 2? To such an arrangement, under such circumstances, I can never
consent.
I have asked for one
of two things: Either the publication of my official report or a court
of inquiry, so that the true facts may come to light and the responsibility
for the disaster be fairly apportioned. For this and nothing else have
I asked, and I shall urge this with all possible energy. Although under
all other circumstances I should be willing to go to some other theater
of war, under these circumstances I am satisfied with my command as it
is and where it is. I consider it a duty to myself and my men to stand
right here until the mist that hangs over the events of the 2d of May is
cleared up.
Besides, I had a conversation
with General Hooker, in the course of which this subject was incidentally
touched, and he pronounced himself decidedly opposed to my going, either
without or with my troops.
I am, general, most respectfully,
yours,
C. SCHURZ,
Major-general.
Maj. Gen. O. O. HOWARD,
Headquarters Eleventh Corps.
[Indorsement. ]
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS,
May 22, 1863.
General Schurz expressed
in a conversation with me on the 19th instant his desire to go with his
division to some other army. I wondered at it at the time. I believe that
it would militate against him and his command to be transferred at this
juncture. I withdraw my request, and will make every effort to reconcile
all difficulties arising from the different nationalities in this command.
Respectfully,
O. O. HOWARD,
Major-General.
[Inclosure.]
HDQRS. ELEVENTH CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Near Brooke's Station, May 21, 1863.
List of German troops in the Eleventh Army Corps.
[Forwarded by Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard, May 21, 1863.]
---Present.--- ---Present and absent.--
Command. Forduty. Total. Commissioned officers. Enlisted men. Total
First Division: 41st New York 371 428 25 584 609 54th New York 243 280 21 382 403 68th New York 259 311 29 410 439 153d Pennsylvania. 639 686 36 815 851 107th Ohio 443 512 24 667 691 Second Division: 27th Pennsylvania. 289 394 27 449 476 73d Pennsylvania. 328 375 26 482 508 29th New York 310 350 32 485 517 Third Division: 74th Pennsylvania. 384 417 31 500 531 75th Pennsylvania. 248 277 27 413 440 45th New York 452 525 31 559 590 119th New York 279 357 31 487 518 82d Illinois 359 423 35 554 589 58th New York 207 253 19 339 358 26th Wisconsin 471 548 31 794 825The following regiments are exclusively German: Forty-first New York, Fifty-fourth New York, Sixty-eighth, Twenty-ninth, Forty-fifth, and Fifty-eighth New York, Twenty-seventh Pennsylvania, Seventy-fourth and Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania, Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, and Eighty-second Illinois, numbering 4,206 present.
The following regiments are mixed nationalities: One hundred and nineteenth New York, One hundred and seventh Ohio, Seventy-third Pennsylvania, and One hundred and fifty-third Pennsylvania, numbering 1,930 present.
-----
CAMP NEAR BROOKE'S STATION, VA.,
May 30, 1863.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
SIR:
To my application for
permission to publish my report of the part taken by my division in the
battle of Chancellorsville, I received, through the Adjutant-General, the
reply that "it is contrary to orders to publish the reports of battles
except through the proper official channels." In accordance with this,
I would, for the reasons enumerated in my letter of the 18th instant, respectfully
request you to publish my report when it reaches the War Department through
the proper channel. I would also most respectfully repeat my request that
if the publication of my report should seem inexpedient to you, a court
of inquiry be granted me for the purpose of publicly investigating the
circumstances surrounding my command on the 2d of May, the causes of its
defeat, and my conduct on that occasion.
I am, sir, most respectfully,
your obedient servant,
C. SCHURZ,
Major-General, Comdg. Third Div.,
Eleventh Army Corps.
(War of the Rebellion, between the Union and Confederate Army. Vol 26, #252 pg 647-658)
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
WARRENTON JUNCTION, VA.,
SIR:
Pursuant to your order,
I hereby respectfully submit a report of the part taken by my regiment
in the late battle of Gettysburg, as stated to me by officers of the regiment,
I myself having been absent on sick leave at the time.
W. H. JACOBS,
Col. W. KRZYZANOWSKI.
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, ELEVENTH CORPS,
GENERAL:
On the part taken by my
command in the battle of Gettysburg, I have the honor to report as follows:
C. SCHURZ,
Maj. Gen. O. O. HOWARD,
-----
HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, ELEVENTH CORPS,
GENERAL:
On the part taken by my
division in the actions of July 2 and 3, I have the honor to submit the
following report:
C. SCHURZ,
Major-General HOWARD,
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/1 [S# 54]
HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS,
GENERAL:
About the part taken by
my command in the night engagement of October 29, I have the honor to report
as follows:
C. SCHURZ,
Major-General HOWARD,
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/2 [S# 55]
HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, ELEVENTH CORPS,
COLONEL:
I have the honor to present
the following report about the part taken by the Third Division in the
operations of the Army of the Cumberland from November 22 to December 17:
C. SCHURZ,
Lieutenant-Colonel MEYSENSURG,
HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, ELEVENTH CORPS,
COLONEL:
I have the honor to present
the following report about the part taken by the Third Division in the
operations of the Army of the Cumberland from November 22 to December 17:
C. SCHURZ,
Lieutenant-Colonel MEYSENBURG,
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/2 [S# 73]
-- Portion --
(Twenty-sixth Wisconsin) almost unserviceable, as well as causing
great hindrance to the regiment next to it (Thirty-third Massachusetts).
Major Winkler, with commendable skill and ability, with no little difficulty
extricated his men from the confused mass into which they had become involved
and brought them again reformed into line. This hill being a position of
much importance to the enemy, it was not to be supposed that he would yield
it without a struggle or without making an effort to retake it after being
driven off. Accordingly, regimental commanders were cautioned that they
might expect to be in turn attacked, but that they must hold the position
at all hazards. The expectation seemed to be well founded, for the enemy
made two furious assaults upon my line, but was gallantly and successfully
repulsed.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[This part came from Wisconsin Historical Society, 1200 Series, Box
128, Correspondence 1862-1863]
Headquarters 26th Reg. Wis. Vol. Infantry.
Sir.
In compliance with your
letter of July 11th 1864, I have the honor to report the following report
of this regiment.
No. 263. -- Report of Col. William H. Jacobs,
Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry.
July 28, 1863.
About 2 p.m. on July
1, the regiment arrived with the rest of your command at the village of
Gettysburg, and was ordered at once to the front. The position assigned
it by you was the extreme right of the brigade. The regiment was furiously
attacked by vastly superior numbers, but held its own until ordered by
you to retreat, when a retreat in good order was effected.
The regiment suffered
very severely in this engagement. The loss in officers is as follows: Lieutenant-Colonel
Boebel, severely wounded; Major Baetz, wounded;
Adjutant
Wallber, taken prisoner; 4 line officers killed, 9 line officers wounded,
and I line officer taken prisoner. The loss of enlisted men is an aggregate
of 200 killed, wounded, and missing.
At about 4 o'clock the
regiment rallied on Cemetery Hill, and was ordered behind the stone fence.
During the artillery fire of July 2 and 3, the regiment suffered no loss.
The behavior of both
officers and men was, so far as I can learn, exemplary. I can state nothing
special for the praise of individuals.
Lieutenant-Colonel Boebel
commanded the regiment during the engagement on July 1. After its arrival
on Cemetery Hill, Captain Fuchs took command until July 4, when I arrived,
and resumed command.
I remain, sir, your obedient
servant,
Colonel, Commanding
Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Volunteers.
Commanding Second Brigade, Third Division.
No. 253. -- Reports of Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz,
U. S. Army, commanding Third Division.
August 20, 1863.
On July 1, at 7 a.m.,
the Third Division left its camp, near Saint Joseph's College, at Emmitsburg,
with orders to march to Gettysburg by way of Homer's Mills.
About 10.30 o'clock,
when my division had just passed the latter place, I received, through
one of your aides, the order to hurry forward my command as fast as possible,
as the First Corps was engaged with the enemy in the neighborhood of Gettysburg.
Leaving the command of the division in General Schimmelfennig's hand, I
hastened to the front, where I arrived about 11.30 o'clock, finding you
upon an eminence east of the cemetery of Gettysburg, from which we overlooked
the field of battle. You informed me that General Reynolds had just been
killed; that you were in command of the whole, and that you had to turn
over the Eleventh Corps to me.
I saw the First Corps
engaged in a lively fight on the ridge northwest of Gettysburg. A dispatch
from General Wadsworth informed us that he was advancing; that the forces
before him were apparently not very strong, and that he thought, although
he had no Clear evidence of it, that the enemy was making a movement toward
his right. The right of the First Corps seemed to extend across the Cashtown
road and the railroad northeast of it. It was at the time difficult to
see how far the ground was in our possession. Of the enemy we saw but little,
and had no means of forming a just estimate of his strength. Either the
enemy was before us in small force, and then we had to push him with all
possible vigor, or he had the principal part of his army there, and then
we had to establish ourselves in a position which would enable us to maintain
ourselves until the arrival of re-enforcements. Either of these cases being
possible, provision was to be made for both. Accordingly you ordered me
to take the Third and First Divisions of the Eleventh Corps through the
town, and to endeavor to gain possession of the eastern prolongation of
the ridge then partly held by the First Corps, while you intended to establish
the Second Division and the artillery, excepting the batteries attached
to the First and Third Divisions, on Cemetery Hill and the eminence east
of it as a reserve.
The Third Division arrived
at -- o'clock, at double-quick; the weather was sultry, and the troops,
who had marched several hours without halting a single time, much out of
breath. I ordered General Schimmelfennig, to whom I turned over the command
of the Third Division, to advance briskly through the town, and to deploy
on the right of the First Corps in two lines. This order was executed with
promptness and spirit.
Shortly afterward the
First Division, under General Barlow, arrived by the Emmitsburg road proper,
advanced through the town, and was ordered by me to form on the right of
the Third Division, its First Brigade to connect with the Third Division
west of the road leading to Mummasburg, while I ordered the Second Brigade
to be held en echelon behind the right of the First Brigade east of the
Mummasburg road. Each division had one battery with it. It was about 2
p.m. when the deployment of the two divisions was accomplished. The Second
Division arriving shortly after; the First remained with you in the position
above indicated.
The engagement between
the First Corps and the enemy had during that time continued briskly, the
enemy being apparently driven to the crest of the ridge upon which the
college building stands.
Hardly were the two divisions deployed a few hundred yards north
of the town, when I received an order from you to remain in the position
I then occupied, and to push my skirmishers forward as far as possible.
This was done, and our skirmishers, who became soon engaged, especially
those of the Third Division, took a considerable number of prisoners.
While this was going
on, two of the enemy's batteries, placed on a hillside opposite the Third
Division, one above the other, opened upon us, flanking the First Corps.
Captain Dilger, whose battery was attached to the Third Division, replied
promptly, dismounting in a short time four of the enemy pieces, and driving
away two regiments which were on a line with the enemy's artillery at the
foot of the hill.
In the meantime the firing
near my extreme left seemed to increase in volume, and, leaving the point
I had selected for myself and staff, on the Mummasburg road, I rode over
toward the left, in order to see what was going on. The right of the First
Corps seemed to be engaged in a very severe struggle. The enemy was evidently
pressing upon that point. At the same time signs were apparent of an advance
of the enemy upon my line, especially the right. The enemy was evidently
stronger than he had been at the commencement of the battle, and the probability
was that re-enforcements were still arriving. Feeling much anxiety about
my right, which was liable to be turned if any of the enemy's forces were
advancing by the Heidlersburg road, I dispatched one of my aides to you,
with the request to have one brigade of the Second Division placed upon
the north side of the town, near the railroad depot, as an echelon to the
First Division. My intention was to have that brigade in readiness to charge
upon any force the enemy might move around my right.
After having taken the necessary observations on my extreme left,
I returned to the Mummasburg road, where I discovered that General Barlow
had moved forward his whole line, thus losing on his left the connection
with the Third Division; moreover, the Second Brigade, of the First Division,
had been taken out of its position en echelon behind the right of the First
Brigade. I immediately gave orders to re-establish the connection by advancing
the right wing of the Third Division, and hurried off aide after aide to
look after the brigade of the Second Division which I had requested you
to send me for the protection of my right and rear, but it had not yet
arrived.
Suddenly the enemy opened
upon the First Division from two batteries placed near the Harrisburg road,
completely enfilading General Barlow's line. This fire, replied to by our
batteries, produced but little effect upon our men. Soon afterward, however,
about 3 o'clock, before the forward movement of the First Division could
be arrested by my orders, the enemy appeared in our front with heavy masses
of infantry, his line extending far beyond our right. It was now clear
that the two small divisions under my command, numbering hardly over 6,000
effective men when going into battle, had a whole corps of the rebel army
to contend against.
The simultaneous appearance
of the enemy's battalions on so long a line led me to believe that they
had been lying in position for some time behind the woods in our front,
fully prepared for us, and that it was their intention, while entangling
us in a fight where we were, to throw their left wing around our right,
and thus to cut us off from the town. A movement to the rear became at
once necessary, but before any orders to that effect could be transmitted,
my whole line was engaged, and the Second Brigade, First Division, whose
flank had been most exposed in consequence of the advance, fell back in
considerable disorder. Unfortunately, General Barlow, who had been directing
the movements of his troops with the most praiseworthy coolness and intrepidity,
unmindful of the shower of bullets around, was severely wounded, and had
to be carried off the battle-field. The command of the First Division devolved
upon General Ames.
It was now of the highest
importance to hold the Middletown and Mummasburg roads. Had the Brigade
of the Second Division been then at the appointed place, I would have ordered
it to charge upon the flanking columns of the enemy, taking them in flank
and rear; but that brigade not being there, all I could do was to endeavor
to rally the Second Brigade, of the First Division, and to hold the ground
west of those roads until the other brigades could be taken back. The enemy,
however, pressing on with great vigor, that brigade could be rallied only
in part, and the First Brigade, of the First Division, finding its right
flank uncovered, was forced back also, not, however, without hotly contesting
every inch of ground.
At that moment it was
reported to me that the right wing of the First Corps had been pressed
back, and one of Major-General Doubleday's aides brought me a request for
a few regiments to be sent over to its assistance, which it was, under
the circumstances, impossible for me to do. I received also a report from
the Third Division, stating that it was flanked on the left. At the same
time your order reached me to withdraw to the south side of the town, and
to occupy the position on and near Cemetery Hill previously chosen by you.
While I was doing my utmost, assisted by the officers of my staff,
to rally what was within my reach of the First Division, in order to check
the enemy's advance upon my right and to hold the entrance of the town,
the First Brigade, of the Second Division, under Colonel Coster, at last
made its appearance. I led it out of the town, and ordered it to deploy
on the right of the junction of the roads near the railroad depot, which
the enemy was fast approaching. It was now too late for executing the offensive
movement upon the enemy's left flank, which I had originally contemplated,
and which might have been made to great advantage ten minutes before, but
the brigade, assisted by a battery, succeeded, at all events, in checking
the enemy long enough to permit the First Division to enter the town without
being seriously molested on its retreat. The Third Division had meanwhile
to sustain a furious attack. According to orders, it fell back toward the
town in good order, contesting the ground step by step with the greatest
firmness.
In this part of the action,
which was almost a hand-to-hand struggle, officers and men showed the highest
courage and determination. Our loss was extremely severe. The Second Brigade,
Third Division, lost all its regimental commanders; several regiments nearly
half their number in killed and wounded. Being flanked right and left,
the situation of that division was most trying.
The retreat through the
town, protected by part of our artillery, was effected as well as
could be expected under such circumstances, the streets being filled with
vehicles of every description and overrun with men of the First Corps.
A considerable number of men, who became entangled in cross streets and
alleys, were taken prisoners by the enemy, who entered the town immediately
after us. General Schimmelfennig fell in this way into the hands of rebel
skirmishers, but succeeded in hiding himself until, on July 4, we retook
possession of Gettysburg.
It was after 5 o'clock
when the Eleventh Corps occupied the position on Cemetery Hill; the Second
Division behind the stone walls inclosing the cemetery on the west side;
the Third Division immediately opposite the town, and the First Division
on the right. The group of houses nearest the cemetery were occupied by
our skirmishers. The enemy did not undertake to attack that position, and
the corps remained in it undisturbed until the enemy resumed the attack
on July 2.
I remain, general, most
respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General.
Commanding Eleventh Corps.
August 20, 1863.
By the losses sustained
in the battle of July 1, the Third Division was reduced to an effective
force of about 1,500 men. A large number of officers were killed, wounded,
or missing, many regiments being under the command of captains. General
Schimmelfennig being still in his hiding place within the lines of the
enemy, Colonel von Amsberg, of the Forty-fifth New York, commanded my First
Brigade.
The position of the Third
Division was behind the stone walls inclosing the cemetery on the northwest
side, an orchard separating it from the first houses of the town. I had
five regiments deployed in the first line, five in column in the second,
connecting on my left with the Second Division, and on my right with the
First. My skirmishers were from 300 to 500 yards in front, and a detachment
in a group of houses near the cemetery.
The enemy made no attack
in the forenoon of July 2. We observed his artillery moving on the ridges
west, north, and east of Gettysburg, and taking position.
About 4 p.m. the enemy
opened upon us from his batteries, the artillery on Cemetery Hill replying
with great spirit. The fire continued for about two hours. Although the
cannonade was fearful and many projectiles fell into our battalions, not
a man belonging to the Third Division, unless wounded, left the ranks.
After the cessation of the cannonade, the enemy made a heavy attack upon
the left wing of the army, which resulted in a complete repulse.
Between 6 and 7 p.m.
the enemy made a demonstration upon our right wing. As soon as the firing
commenced, you ordered me to send one of my brigades to the support of
General Ames, commanding the First Division. I took the First Brigade,
Colonel von Amsberg commanding, out of its position, filling its place
behind the stone wall with the reserve regiments of the Second Brigade.
One of the five regiments of the First Brigade (Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania)
was left with General Ames to strengthen his right wing. The remaining
four were directed toward a strip of woods on the right of the First Division,
in which the firing had become very heavy, and where, according to the
reports of some staff officers of the First Corps, immediate aid was needed.
Two regiments (the One hundred and fifty-seventh New York and the Sixty-first
Ohio) were guided by one of these officers, while two others (the Eighty-second
Illinois and Forty-fifth New York) were led by the chief of my staff, Lieutenant-Colonel
Otto, of the Fifty-eighth New York. It had meanwhile become quite dark,
the direction of the fight being indicated by nothing but the sound of
the musketry. The regiments entered the woods with the greatest determination,
and drove the enemy from our rifle-pits, of which at several points he
had already gained possession.
It is my pleasant duty
to mention as especially deserving, the names of Lieutenant-Colonel Otto,
who superintended this operation with great judgment and courage, and of
Lieutenant-Colonel Salomon, of the Eighty-second Illinois, who displayed
the highest order of coolness and determination, under very trying circumstances.
At 9 o'clock the enemy
was repulsed at that point, and no further demonstration made. While this
was going on, between 8 and 9 p.m., we suddenly heard a rapid musketry
fire on the eminence immediately east of the cemetery, where Captain Wiedrich's
battery stood. You ordered me to take two regiments across the road to
the aid of that battery. This order was executed by two regiments of the
Second Brigade, the One hundred and nineteenth and Fifty-eighth New York,
headed by Colonel Krzyzanowski, commanding Second Brigade. I at once hastened
with my whole staff toward the threatened point, driving back stragglers
with our swords as we went. To my great surprise, we found a general melee
in the battery itself, the enemy's infantry having already gotten possession
of some of the guns. The cannoneers were defending themselves valiantly.
Our infantry made a vigorous rush upon the intruders, and, after a short
but very spirited hand-to-hand fight, succeeded in driving them down the
hill.
I cannot refrain from
speaking of the conduct of the officers and men on that occasion with the
greatest satisfaction.
The regiments, thus scattered
among other commands, were withdrawn during the night, and returned to
their former positions.
In the action of July
3, no part of my command but my skirmishers was engaged. During the memorable
cannonade of the afternoon, my men behaved with the same firmness which
they had exhibited on the preceding day.
At daybreak on July 4,
the Fifty-eighth New York, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Otto, entered
the town of Gettysburg, the enemy having retreated, and took over 280 prisoners,
among whom were several commissioned officers.
At 8 a.m. Colonel Krzyzanowski,
with the One hundred and nineteenth New York and the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin,
made a reconnaissance toward the ridge opposite our right; and took 47
additional prisoners. He was called back without having found the enemy.
On the 5th, we marched to Emmitsburg.
A report exhibiting the heavy losses my division suffered in the
three days' battle has already been submitted to you. It bears ample testimony
that my men in that battle fought with bravery, and never yielded without
necessity.
I am, general, most respectfully,
yours,
Major-General, Commanding Third Division.
Commanding Eleventh Corps.
OCTOBER 26-29, 1863.--Reopening of the Tennessee River ...
No. 21. --Report of Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz, U.S. Army, commanding
Third Division.
Camp near Brown's Ferry, October 31, 1863.
We arrived in camp near
Brown's Ferry, north of the Kelley's Ferry road, about 4.30 p.m. on October
28. Part of my Third Brigade was left behind on detached service. The camp
we occupied was flanked on the left by a row of steep hills; on the right
by the Raccoon Mountain; front toward Wauhatchie. The road from Brown's
Ferry to Wauhatchie runs along steep ridges, intersected by gaps and ravines,
through one of which runs the Kelley's Ferry road, and through another
the Chattanooga Railroad, the two being about 500 yards apart. On the right
of the road is a valley about one-half mile wide, partly corn-fields and
partly timber and brush. This valley is bordered on the right by the Raccoon
Mountain. The hills are thickly wooded. My picket line ran along the Kelley's
Ferry road, forming an angle where it touches the Raccoon Mountain, so
as to cover our right. General Geary's command, which had followed mine
on the march, encamped at Wauhatchie, about 3 miles from our camp. About
midnight we were disturbed by a few shots on our picket line, which, however,
indicated nothing serious.
About 1 a.m., October
29, lively firing was heard in the direction of Wauhatchie. Soon after,
I was ordered to send one of my brigades to occupy the hill in the angle
formed by the road to Wauhatchie and the Chattanooga Railroad. I ordered
my First Brigade, under General Tyndale, to move at once, and as rapidly
as possible, and placed myself at the head of the column. It was bright
moonlight. About one-half mile from our camp, while moving through the
fields, in order to cut off the angles of the road, according to your direction,
the flankers on my left were attacked by a rebel force concealed in the
woods on a hill on my left, and my leading regiment received a full volley,
which wounded 1 of my staff officers, Captain Lender, and several men.
This rebel force was, however, immediately afterward attacked by regiments
of the Second Division, and we continued our march toward the hill General
Tyndale was to occupy. Finding the ground on the open field boggy and impassable
just before reaching the base of hill, the brigade had to march by the
left flank to gain the road.
The hill being in possession
of the enemy, orders were given to take it. A short engagement ensued.
The enemy was speedily dislodged, the regiments of my First Brigade moving
up
rapidly. General Tyndale then established himself in the position assigned
to him. I reported this to General Hooker, who ordered me to form a junction
with General Geary's command. I directed Colonel Krzyzanowski, commanding
my Second Brigade, to occupy the gap northeast of the hill held by General
Tyndale and Colonel Hecker, commanding my Third Brigade, to march to Wauhatchie
with the Sixty-eighth New York, the One hundred and forty-first New York,
and six companies of the Eightieth Illinois. He was ordered to open a passage,
at whatever cost, if he found the enemy in force on his way. The Seventy-fifth
Pennsylvania was directed to occupy the railroad gap. We had no information
of the enemy's movements, and could see but little in the darkness of the
woods. Colonel Hecker, however, found no serious resistance, and, after
a slight skirmish, effected his junction with General Geary's command.
He arrived at Wauhatchie before daybreak, and reported himself to General
Geary in person about 5 a.m.
At 6 a.m. I received
the order to send another brigade to General Geary. Deeming it necessary
to hold the important position occupied by General Tyndale, I ordered Colonel
Krzyzanowski to leave a detachment in the position he then had, and to
march with the remainder of his command to Wauhatchie. He reported there
about 7 a.m.
My loss was 37 officers
and men. We took a number of prisoners.
I am, general, most respectfully,
yours,
Major-General, Commanding Third Division.
Commanding Eleventh Corps.
NOVEMBER 23-27, 1863.--The Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign.
No. 106.--Report of Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz, U. S. Army, commanding
Third Division, including march to the relief of Knoxville.
Lookout Valley, December 22, 1863.
On November 22, I received the order to leave my camp in Lookout
Valley and to march to Chattanooga. My division started at noon and arrived
at its camping ground, on the right of General Wood's division in front
of Chattanooga, after dark.
On November 23, about
noon, two divisions of the Army of the Cumberland attacked the enemy in
front and carried the first line of rifle-pits. At 2 p.m. I received the
order to take position in the woods on the left of those divisions, between
Orchard Knob and the Tennessee River, connecting on my right with General
Wood and on my left with the Second Division of this corps, In taking this
position I had a slight skirmish with the enemy's pickets, and was exposed
to the fire of a rebel battery placed on the slope of Missionary Ridge,
opposite Orchard Knob. I pushed my skirmishers out as far as Citico Creek,
and remained in this position during the night.
November 24, at daybreak,
the enemy opened a lively fire upon my skirmishers from a line of rifle-pits
on the other side of Citico Creek. I was ordered to strengthen my front
with intrenchments, and did so. Occasional skirmishing occurred during
the day, but nothing of a serious nature. Colonel Buschbeck's brigade having
been detached from the Second Division to open communication with General
Sherman's command, which had crossed the Tennessee on our extreme left
at daybreak, I was ordered about 3 p.m. to send one brigade to the left
to complete that communication. Colonel Krzyzanowski, whose brigade had
formed my reserve, was ordered off accordingly. Late in the afternoon I
received an order from General Grant to support the forces on my right
and left, in case of an attack, to the best of my ability, but if not attacked
to do nothing that might bring on a general engagement. The night passed
quietly.
November 25, shortly
after sunrise, I was directed by General Howard to drive the enemy's skirmishers
out of the rifle-pits in my front, which was executed by Colonel Hecker
without serious resistance on the part of the rebels. Colonel Krzyzanowski's
brigade rejoined me by order of General Howard. The corps was then ordered
to march to the support of General Sherman, crossing Citico Creek near
its mouth and following the Tennessee River to General Sherman's pontoon
bridge. I took position on General Sherman's left about 2 p.m. My command
had no enemy in front, except a few skirmishers, and nothing of importance
occurred.
November 26, the corps marched in pursuit of the retreating enemy
to Chickamauga Station, and camped within 3 miles of Graysville, arriving
in camp one hour after sundown.
November 27, marched
to Parker's Gap, the Second Division leading; my Third Brigade, together
with the Second Brigade, Second Division, was ordered to destroy the railroad
at Red Clay. The division camped at the crossing of the Red Clay and Cleveland
roads.
The destruction of the
railroad was successfully accomplished. My Third Brigade reported back
at 1 a.m., November 28. November 28, the division camped near Parker's
Gap.
November 29, marched
to Cleveland, Third Division leading; nothing of importance.
November 30, marched
to Charleston, Second Division leading. December 1, marched to Athens.
December 2, marched to
Sweet Water and Philadelphia, driving a little detachment of rebel cavalry
before us. Arrived in camp, 2 miles beyond Philadelphia, about one hour
after sundown.
December 3, the Third
Division broke camp at 4 a.m. and entered Loudon (which had been abandoned
by the enemy during the night) before sunrise, Colonel Krzyzanowski's brigade
leading. Considerable stores were found and distributed among the troops.
December 4, one regiment
of Colonel Hecker's brigade crossed the river in a flat-boat, drove away
a rebel cavalry detachment, and found four pieces of artillery spiked in
a field-work on the opposite bank. The regiment was withdrawn before sundown.
From December 6 to December
17, marched to Louisville and returned to our old camps in Lookout Valley
without any incidents worthy of notice. We arrived in camp on December
17, at 3 p.m.
I have the honor to affix
a list of casualties.
I am, colonel, very respectfully,
Major-General, Comdg. Third Div., Eleventh Army Corps.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Lookout Valley, December 22, 1863.
On November 22, I received
the order to leave my camp in Lookout Valley and to march to Chattanooga.
My division started at noon and arrived at its camping ground, on the right
of General Wood's division in front of Chattanooga, after dark.
On November 23, about
noon, two divisions of the Army of the Cumberland attacked the enemy in
front and carried the first line of rifle-pits. At 2 p.m. I received the
order to take position in the woods on the left of those divisions, between
Orchard Knob and the Tennessee River, connecting on my right with General
Wood and on my left with the Second Division of this corps. In taking this
position I had a slight skirmish with the enemy's pickets, and was exposed
to the fire of a rebel battery placed on the slope of Missionary Ridge,
opposite Orchard Knob. I pushed my skirmishers out as far as Citico Creek,
and remained in this position during the night.
November 24, at daybreak,
the enemy opened a lively fire upon my skirmishers from a line of rifle-pits
on the other side of Citico Creek. I was ordered to strengthen my front
with entrenchments, and did so. Occasional skirmishing occurred during
the day, but nothing of a serious nature. Colonel Bushbeck's brigade having
been detached from the Second Division to open communication with General
Sherman's command, which had crossed the Tennessee on our extreme left
at daybreak, I was ordered about 3 p.m. to send one brigade to the left
to complete that communication. Colonel Krzyzanowski, whose brigade had
formed my reserve, was ordered off accordingly. Late in the afternoon I
received an order from General Grant to support the forces on my right
and left, in case of an attack, to the best of my ability, but if not attacked
to do nothing that might bring on a general engagement. The night passed
quietly.
November 25, shortly
after sunrise, I was directed by General Howard to drive the enemy's skirmishers
out of the rifle-pits in my front, which was executed by Colonel Hecker
without serious resistance on the part of the rebels. Colonel Krzyzanowski's
brigade rejoined me by order of General Howard. The corps was then ordered
to march to the support of General Sherman, crossing Citico Creek near
its mouth and following the Tennessee River to General Sherman's pontoon
bridge. I took position on General Sherman's left about 2 p.m. My command
had no enemy in front, except a few skirmishers, and nothing of importance
occurred.
November 26, the corps marched in pursuit of the retreating enemy
to Chickamauga Station, and camped within 3 miles of Graysville, arriving
in camp one hour after sundown. November 27, marched to Parker's Gap, the
Second Division leading; my Third Brigade, together with the Second Brigade,
Second Division, was ordered to destroy the railroad at Red Clay. The division
camped at the crossing of the Red Clay and Cleveland roads. The destruction
of the railroad was successfully accomplished.
My Third Brigade reported
back at 1 a.m., November 28.
November 28, the division
camped near Parker's Gap.
November 29, marched
to Cleveland, Third Division leading; nothing of importance.
November 30, marched
to Charleston, Second Division leading.
December 1, marched to
Athens.
December 2, marched to
Sweet Water and Philadelphia, driving a little detachment of rebel cavalry
before us. Arrived in camp, 2 miles beyond Philadelphia, about one hour
after sundown.
December 3, the Third
Division broke camp at 4 a.m. and entered Loudon (which had been abandoned
by the enemy during the night) before sunrise, Colonel Krzyzanowski's brigade
leading. Considerable stores were found and distributed among the troops.
December 4, one regiment
of Colonel Hecker's brigade crossed the river in a flat-boat, drive away
a rebel cavalry detachment, and found four pieces of artillery spiked in
a field-work on the opposite bank. The regiment was withdrawn before sundown.
From December 6 to December
17, marched to Louisville and returned to our old camps in Lookout Valley
without any incidents worthy of notice. We arrived in camp on December
17, at 3 p.m.
I have the honor to affix
a list of casualties.
I am, colonel, very respectfully,
Major-General, Comdg. Third Div., Eleventh Army Corps.
Assistant Adjutant-General
MAY 1-SEPTEMBER 8, 1864.--The Atlanta (Georgia) Campaign.
No. 268.--Report of Col. James Wood, jr., One hundred and thirty-sixth
New York Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.
Near Atlanta, Georgia, Aug. 25 1864
General August Gaylord, Adjutant General State of Wisconsin.
The regiment was mostly recruited in the latter half of August 1862,
rendezvoused at Camp Sigel, Milwaukee and was
there mustered into the U. S. service the 17th September 1862.
On the 6th of October,
1862, it left Milwaukee and proceeded on its way to Washington D. C. where
it arrived on the 11th of that month. On the next day it marched from that
city over the long bridge to Arlington Heights, receiving orders then,
assigning it to the 11th Army Corps, Commanded by Major General Franz
Sigel. It marched from the Heights on the 15th of October to Fairfax
Courthouse, Va. a distance of 15 miles, and there joined the 2nd brigade
commanded by Col. W. Krzyzanowski of the 3rd Division
Commanded by Maj. General Carl Schurz of the 11th
Army Corp.
The regiment incamped
at Fairfax Courthouse, occupied in drilling and picket duty until November
2nd on which day the 3rd Division marched through Centerville to the Bull
Run Battlefield and proceeded the next day to Thorough fare Gap. While
at this place 2nd Lieut John Orth of Company I was dangerously wounded
while on picket duty. On the 7th day of November, camps were again struck
and the Division marched through the Gap to New Baltimore. On the 9th of
the same month they marched to Gainsville, Va., there incamped.
Nov. 18th, returned to Centerville. At Centerville we remained until
the 9th of December 1862 when the 11th Corps was ordered to support of
Maj General Burnside, who was then preparing his great attack on Fredricksburg.
They marched to Falmouth on the Rappahonnock by way of Dumfries and Stafford
Courthouse, arriving then on the 14th of December, a day after the bloody
battle of Fredericksburg. This march was one of the hardest the Regt. ever
made. Rain and melting snow had made the roads almost impassable, arriving
at our Camping grounds generally late in the evening, the tents had to
be pitched in the snow and mud; rations, too, were very much reduced, a
part of the time.
From Falmouth the Corps returned to Stafford Courthouse 9 miles in its
rear on the 17th day of Dec. 1862. Here winter quarters were built (right,
unknown regiment), but only enjoyed for a short time. On the 21st of Dec.
the regiment was sent towards Dumfries where an attack had been made by
the enemy. After marching, about 4 miles the regiment was however recalled.
On the 19th day of January,
1863, the Corps marched to the neighborhood of Beriah Church, Va. The regiment,
being detailed as rear guard, however remained in the neighborhood of Stafford
C. H. for a few days and then followed the Corps to Beriah Church. On the
4th day of February, and put as we had completed another set of winter
quarters, orders to march were again received and returned to the neighborhood
of Stafford Court House. There we built winter quarters again and finally
settled down in them. The winter was passed in drilling, and in a course
of general instructions, besides the usual round of picket and fatigue
duty. By this time the strength of the regiment had been conciderably reduced
by sickness, deaths, and discharged so that the aggregate effective force
of the regiment at the time of entering on the Chancellorsville Campaign
was about (left blank).
On the 27th day of April
this great campaign opened. The 11th Corps, then under the Command of Major
General Howard, and with it the 26th, broke camp on that day and marched
on that and the following day to Kelley's Ferry on the Rappahanick. At
midnight of the 28th day of April, the pontoons were completed and we crossed
the Rappahonick and marched that same night 3 miles beyond the river. The
next morning we pursued our course and at about 5 o'clock P. M. reached
the Rapid Ann at Germania Mills. Again in the dark of night we crossed
the river and next day continued our march till we reached Locust Grove
near Chancellorsville. This was on the 30th day of April 1863. The 11th
Corps here formed the extreme right of the Army of the Potomac.
On the 1st of May the
Regiment was made and put in the second line, the line facing south or
nearly so. An attack by the enemy was hourly expected but not made. On
the 2nd at about 10 o'clock A. M. the brigade to which the regiment attached
was withdrawn from its position and put in line so as to protect the flank
of the Army. We then faced about west and were in position at right angles
with the main army, but some what retired from its extreme right. The 26th
was in fine line, deployed in line of battle in an open pieces of ground,
in its front at a distance of about 75 yards was a strip of heavy timber.
In this and about 300 yards distant from the regiment it deployed a heavy
line of skirmishers and sent Companies A., B. to their support.
Thus matters stood until 5 o'clock P. M. Not a shot was fired by
our skirmishers nor neighborhood. No breastwork or protection of any kind
had been put up. The regiments had stacked their arms and the men were
cooking their coffee. Bands played national airs and nothing indicated
that an enemy was near or forboded the terrible storm that was approaching
till at once a shot was fired on the skirmish line, then another and then
the rattling volleys told us that the enemy was upon us.
We were struck directly in front, the line of the main army was thus attacked
on the right flanks in rear of the right flank. the extreme right gave
way immediately, the men rushing by us and through our line in their hasty
flight. Scarcely had the regiment fallen in and taken its arms when the
rebels appeared in the edge of the woods. Our skirmish line had mean while
been completely crushed. Captain Pizzala Commanding
it was killed by the first volley. Companies A and B finding it useless
to stay, hastened back with the few of our skirmishers that remained and
rejoined the regiment. On the left of the 26th stood the 119th N.Y. Vols.
and on it's left the line of the main army was giving way - on our right
was nothing. (left, Howard attempting to persuade the men to return to
battle.)
The two regiments thus
almost isolated stubbornly held their ground; volley after volley they
poured into the ranks of the enemy, checking what was in their front but
being themselves fearfully reduced in numbers.
The left of the enemy by far overlapping our right past foward unresisted
and we were in danger of being cut off. Thus had we desperately fought
the enemy for about 1/4 hour when we received the order from our brigade
commander to fall back. We fell back but left upon the bloody field nearly
200 of our best men. About one mile in our rear of the original position
the regiment, or what remained of it, formed again. It had meanwhile grown
dark and the advance of the enemy had been stopped.
Early in the morning
of the 3rd, we marched back with the balance of the core to the left of
the army near U.S. Ford and went into position there. A part of the regiment
was again thrown out as skirmishers and was actually engaged during the
day and a part of the night without suffering any loss.
On the morning of the 4th our division moved further to the right
and again took up a position. Thus we remained until 3 o'clock on the morning
of the 6th of May when the order was given to recross the Rappahanock.
We crossed the river on pontoon bridges and marched back on the same day
to our old camp near Stafford Courthouse.
The following are the
casualties of the officers of the regiment in the Battle. Capt. Chas. Pizzala,
killed, August Schucle, do.; Capt. Charles W. Neukirch, wounded, 1st Lt.
Chas
Doerflinger, do.; 2nd Lt. Aug Greno, do.; 2nd Lt. Adolph Cordies, do.;
1st Lt. Robert Leuelle do.; 2nd Lt. Henry Rosther
Rauth, taken prisoner. Thirty five enlisted men were killed, one hundred
and twelve wounded, nineteen taken prisoners and three missing.
On the 16th day of May
we moved our camp to a place near Brooks Station, Va. about 1 mile from
the old position. Here we remained until the 12th day of June on which
day we broke camp and started off on the Gettysburg Campaign under the
Command of Lt. Col. Boebel, Col. Jacobs being absent sick. Our effective
strength now was (no number given) men. Our first march was to Hartford
Church, Va. when we camped for the night. On the 13th we marched to Caltlets
Station. On the 14th we went to Centerville, Va. In the neighborhood of
this place we remained on the 15th and 16th. On the morning of the 17th
we left Centerville and marched to Goose Creek, Va. the day was intensely
hot and the road very dusty. On Goose Creek we camped and remained to the
24th. On that day we marched to the banks of the Potomac near the mouth
of Goosecreek.
At 4:30 P. M. of the
25th of June we crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry and marched to Jeffersonville,
Md. On the 26th, marched to Middleton, Md. and remained there on the 27th.
On the 28th, marched to Frederick, Md. Left there the next day and marched
to Emmitsburg, Md. where we remained until the morning of the 1st of July.
At 7 in the morning of that day we received orders to march. We crossed
the Maryland boundary, it was about 11 o'clock when we arrived in the vicinity
of Gettysburg.
The thunder of cannons
proclaimed that the battle was already progressing. The first Corps was
engaged entering the town from the south side we marched through it, a
north westerly direction and formed a line. A little beyond it in an open
wheat field. The 26th was put in the 2nd line of our brigade and masted
in double column; after a delay of about 1/2 hour, the order was given
to advance. The second line advanced but a short distance and halted. While
the first line marched to a strip of timber in their front about 200 yds
distant.
They had hardly reached it when they were attacked by overwhelming
numbers and at once gave way in the utmost confusion. The second line was
then pushed forward. Marching forward. The 26th when it had arrived at
about 100 yards from the enemy who was then eagerly pressing forward, deployed
into line of battle and opened a murderous fire. On our left was again
the 119th N. Y. Vols. and our right we had no connection or support whatever.
The enemy were checked,
but for a short time. Through the heavy clouds of smoke the enemy could
be seen advancing in heavy lines on our left flank raking our thin line
with an infilading fire. The 119th N. Y. was doubled up and throw on our
left Companies. Closer and closer the enemy pressed on our left wing until
they were within 15 to 20 paces of it. Then the order was given by the
Brig. Commander to retreat. The open field over which we now had to retrace
our step was swift by the hostile bullets, and many a brave man was laid
low, while attempting to cross.
Of the officers engaged in this conflict only four - Capt. Carl Frenekes,
Leuits.. Schmidt and Raush escaped unhurt. It is not strange therefore
that the regiment became considerably scattered in the retreat. At the
outskirts of the town, a hall was made and the advance of the enemy again
engaged and we then fell back in rear of the retreating column through
the main thorough fare of the town to Cemetery Hill (right, Arch at Cemetery
Hill) where the regiment was at once reformed and put in line behind a
low stone fence resting its right on the street.
Capt. Fuchs whose wound
was light had been dressed at once, rejoined and took command. Soon after
Lieut. Fraumer came up from Emmetsburg with a detail which had been on
picket some miles from the place the previous night and not relieved in
time to join the regiment before marching in the morning. This detachment
was again put on picket the evening right immediately in front of the regiment
and was engaged in a hot skirmish, all the time in which two men were killed
and two wounded.
During the 2nd and 3rd
days battles the regiment did not change position nor sustain any further
losses. The total losses in this battle were as follows: Officers killed:
Capt. William Smith, 2nd Lieut. Martin Goung, 2nd Lieut. Charles Bruckert,
2nd Lieut. Pale Rook. Officers wounded: Lt. Col Uaus Boebel, Major Henry
Baetz, Capt. Lackner, Capt. Fuchs, Capt. Fuertenberg,
1st Lieut. Otto Fraemel, 1st Lieut. August Bartoch, 2nd Lieut Conrad Grode,
2nd Lieut Wm. Shenimege, 2nd Lieut. Leopold Melchior, 2nd Lieut. Sigmound
Juenger, 2nd Lieut Joseph Mischauer. Officers taken prisioner: Capt. Bernhard
Domschke and 1st Lieut. Albert Wallber.
Enlisted men killed, thirty seven, wounded, one hundred and twenty five
and taken prisoner thirty seven, missing six.
Early in the morning
of the 4th the regiment was sent with one other regiment of the Brig. on
a reconnocence to the east of Cemetery Hill and soon found that the enemy
was gone and returned to its former position, bringing in number of prisoners.
In the afternoon, Col. Jacobs arrived and resumed command. About 7 P. M.
the next day, the march southward was commenced and continued some mile
through mud and darkness and the next morning as far as Emmitsburg.
On the 7th, the regiment
marched all the way to Middletown, some thirty-three miles, crossing the
Ketochan Mountain over a very rough and difficult road. About 3 P. M. the
next day it started for Boonsboro where Kilpatrick was engaged with Stuart
and said to be rather hard pressed. Our Division was sent to his support
and after passing over South Mountain marched thought the town ready for
action, but found that the Rebel Cavalry had already been driven from the
field.
On the 10th, marched
to near Funkstown, on the 12th, crossed Antietam Creek and took position
and entrenched between Funkstown and Hagers town where our army was massed,
directly by, opposite the Rebel Army. Remained here the 13th. The 14th,
marched over the enemy's abandoned works to Willams Port to find the enemy
there. Started again at 4 A. M. the 15th and marched back to Middletown
and continued our march the 1